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53 – Reasons for a Reform
With the ‘90s the situation became untenable. The Maastricht Treaty
signed in February 1992 set a goal – the single currency – and some
convergence criteria to be met in order to be part of the new monetary
system.
For a while in Italy there was uncertainty whether to be “in” – that is
in the group of the first entrants – because almost everybody thought that it
was impossible to meet the criteria. Eventually the decision was taken to
make any effort in order to be part from the very beginning of the Economic
and Monetary Union.
To many decision makers – both in the political and economic
sectors – one very important argument behind this decision was the
possibility of proposing and enacting unpopular reforms under the
justification of the EMU: Europe was used as an external pressure in order
to break political and social opposition to change.
Many were the causes of the public deficits and mounting public
debt. Some of them were of a general, national nature and possible solutions
did not involve any kind of decentralisation or federalism. Others on the
contrary were linked to the characteristics of the Italian administrative and
political set-up. We are specifically interested in these and will present them
briefly.
3.1 – Local Government Financial Accountability
One of the factors causing public deficits was the quite peculiar
situation of regional, and more generally local, governments: they were
given many responsibilities by the mere activation of all the provisions
listed in the Italian Costituzione. In order to fulfil these duties Italian regions
did not have any relevant taxation power and relied on transfers from the
central government; at the same time the budget constraints were very soft
because almost every time their deficits were covered by additional
resources granted by Rome, the central government.
In many cases there was a perverse incentive to spend more and
more because transfers were determined on a historical basis: so the biggest
spenders were also the biggest receivers. Almost no fiscal responsibility
existed, regions could spend without any economic or political cost: they
were not required to make their citizens pay for the services received.
The result was even worse because the implementation of the
regional government reform coincided with the fiscal reform - which
abolished almost all local revenue sources.
6By the beginning of the ‘90s this anomaly became so evident that a
vast majority was in favour of abolishing it and making regions more
accountable to their citizens. Of course there were groups or local
authorities that were very lukewarm about any change: after all it was quite
convenient to provide services and protest against central government
taxation. In addition some regions feared the inevitable reduction in
resources, being rather poor. Moreover the prospect of fiscal competition
between regions was rather new to everybody and costs seemed bigger than
benefits.
Eventually the Italian Parliament had to pass legislation setting
specific constraints on local and regional governments’ deficits (the so-
called “internal stability pact”).
3.2 – Efficiency in the Local Public Sector
The Italian public sector expenditure is not (and was) out of line with
most countries of the (now) European Union - contrary to a commonly held
view. The real problems were on the one hand public deficits and on the
other hand the inefficiencies of the bureaucracy and the low quality of the
services provided.
The first problem dates back many decades and is due to the rather
low wages and salaries paid to civil servants (at least compared to the
private sector payments) and to the selection and training processes: the
former was biased by political patronage and the second almost non
existent.
In addition the main responsibility of a bureaucrat was supposed to
be the interpretation of law and by-laws, very often quite complex and
ambiguous, not the implementation of given policies.
With time the influence of the trade unions grew and it became
almost impossible to discipline any bureaucrat even guilty of rather serious
crimes: this was widely accepted by people and institutions involved
because it made void the idea of personal responsibility.
The general public had very few chances of getting redress from
inefficient - or even unfair – behaviour of a civil servant.
The quality of the services produced by the public sector was
generally quite low. Here too there was little that could be done:
competition by private producers was difficult or prohibited, even if people
ingenuity was sometimes able to make the difference.
The situation was quite similar for the central and the local
governments: the behaviour of the two did not differ in a significant way
because the kind of controls and political pressure by citizens were almost
the same. Of course there were a few “islands” of efficiency concentrated
7mainly in northern areas of Italy because of the historical tradition of local
autonomy and good government.
As some sort of compensation taxation in Italy was lighter than in
other European countries and even more tariffs for public goods or services.
Evasion too was quite relevant, in particular for some specific groups or
taxes: income taxes for self-employed people or VAT in some productive
sectors or with small and medium firms.
There was a balance, even if a perverse one: the services are bad but
the price one pays is low. For example local (and rail) transports were slow
and unreliable but tariffs were very low (trains in Italy were two thirds
cheaper than in UK or Germany and one half than in France).
3.3 – Interregional Equalisation
Another problem that became acute during the ‘80s and the
beginning of the ‘90s was the interregional redistribution of resource
operated by the central government.
The most relevant and criticised feature was the huge transfer of
resources from the North (and the Centre) to the South of Italy. When
budget constraints were soft and growth rates not negligible it did not raise
much opposition but with harder times (and a changing political situation –
as we shall see in the next paragraph) dissatisfaction grew.
The interregional redistribution was partially justified by the much
lower income per head in most Southern areas but the lack of positive
effects – the gap did not narrow – was (rightly) interpreted as misuse of the
funds due to inefficiency and corruption.
The problem was made more acute by the fact that other kinds of
unequitable, or at least unexplainable, transfers happened: from ordinary
statute regions to special statute ones, from large regions to small ones –
even at similar income per head levels.
The biases could not be explained by the aim of providing every
person an equal amount of (public) goods and services.
Other redistributive aspects are quite important – the
intergenerational one and the one between social groups. The former
operates mainly through state pension schemes and is now at the centre of
the political debate. There is a widespread opinion that state pensions are
too generous with old workers and recently retired people (in particular
female ones) because the prevailing system was a redistributive one and the
8benefits were fixed in times when the ratio of retired to active workers was
low. With the ageing of the population and longer life expectancy younger
generations will have to bear an excessive burden.
The second aspect too is geared against younger generations or
better against people asking for a job because labour laws and by-laws
protect employed persons against unemployed ones.
These aspects are now quite hotly debated but were not so sensitive
up to the beginning of the ‘90s.
3.4 – Changes in the Political Scene
At the same time the collapse of communist regimes in Soviet Union
and other East European countries modified deeply the Italian political
scene.
Since mid-‘70s many laws were enacted and policies adopted with a
large “bipartisan” support: opposition parties voted for (or abstained over)
most bills after a quite intense bargaining process that led to some
modifications of the original draft proposed by governments. The boundary
between government political parties and opposition ones on the left became
blurred; the result very often was compromise not reform, delay not action.
At the same time there was some sort of a veto for the (then so
called) Communist Party to enter government. With the disappearance of
the world bipolarisation between West and East the veto too lapsed.
Politics in Italy became more flexible meaning that there was for the
first time after WWII a real possibility of an alternative in government.
A second important element appeared: the rapid growth of many
regional parties in the North (the most important area from an economic
point of view) among which one based mainly in Lombardy – Lega Nord o
Northern Alliance - got the greatest support. The main reason for the
success of these political parties was a growing dissatisfaction with the
inefficiencies of the central government and more specifically with the low
quality of the public services and goods provided coupled with the transfer
of relevant amounts of resources from the northern regions to the southern
ones.
In particular the latter reason played an important role in winning
votes for these parties. The ‘90s saw a reversal of previous attitudes and
preferences in European public opinions, from a marked concern for social
issues and in particular a more equalitarian personal income distribution to
rather individualistic if not selfish behaviours. In many European countries
– Germany, Switzerland, among others – richer social groups and regions
objected to equalising transfers by central governments.
9In Italy this happened simultaneously with the decline of the two
main political parties (the Christian Democratic and the Socialist ones) due
to bribes and corruption charges, in a quite novel but effective activity by
the judiciary in order to make politics cleaner.
The regional political parties became essential in forming local
governments in the northern regions and fluctuated between federalism and
separatism. They stressed the inefficiencies of the central government and
the excessive (in their opinion) transfer of funds from the North to the
South. Another hot point they made was the centralisation in rules and
bylaws: everything was decided in Rome, in the same way for every part of
Italy. The examples of Germany and Switzerland – with large autonomies
given to any land and canton – were taken as possible solutions for Italy too.
The mere administrative and operational decentralisation was not
any more enough.
No political party could neglect this appeal to federalism and
decentralisation. The Northern regions make up about 40 % of the
population – and votes – and much more of the GDP – and taxes.
The result was a rather deep change in the Costituzione giving
regions (but not provinces and municipalities) much wider powers. The shift
was essentially from a positive list to a negative list: while previously
regions could legislate on a given number of problems now they can decide
on everything that is not excluded and reserved to the central government.
4 – Decentralisation and Devolution in the Nineties
The reform implemented in the nineties has radically reshaped the
finance of both Regions and Municipalities. Here we focus on Regions as
they represent at present the main counterpart of the central government in
the political debate on fiscal federalism.
4.1 – The Enlargement of the Fiscal Autonomy of Ordinary Statute Regions
At the beginning of the Nineties Ordinary Statute Regions (OSR)
have basically no fiscal autonomy. Up to 98% of total revenue are transfers
from the central government. Further, nearly all of these grants are
conditioned to the financing of the National Health Service (NHS) (which
represents nearly 80% of total regional expenditure) and of other minor
expenditure programs.
During the decade there have been several attempts to increase the
fiscal autonomy of OSR. We can single out two phases in the reform
process. In the first phase, the central government introduces the essential
